Upcoming Event: Empowering Local Village Elders and Women in Afghanistan

Empowering Local Village Elders and Women in Afghanistan

Please join us to hear by detailed presentation by Claire Russo, a former U.S. Marine officer, as she discusses her efforts in RC-East to improve local dispute resolution by empowering local village elders. She will also discuss the role of Female Engagement Teams in Afghanistan as part of the counterinsurgency effort.

Guest Speaker: Claire Russo
ISW Contributor
Former U.S. Marine officer

When: Wednesday, April 7, 2010

0845 -0900
Registration and breakfast

0900 – 1030
Presentation by Claire Russo

Where: Institute for the Study of War
Rooftop conference room
1616 P St NW (entrance)
Washington, DC 20036

RSVP: RSVP@understandingwar.org
(202) 293-5550

Media requests: Megan Ortagus
mortagus@understandingwar.org
(863) 398-6184 cell

The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) is a non-partisan, non-profit, public policy research organization. ISW advances an informed understanding of military affairs through reliable research, trusted analysis, and innovative education. We are committed to improving the nation’s ability to execute military operations and respond to emerging threats in order to achieve U.S. strategic objectives. www.UnderstandingWar.org

President Kimberly Kagan and Research Director Marisa Cochrane Sullivan discuss Iraqi Elections (VOA)

March 11, 2010

After a discussion about the recent Iraqi elections, ISW President Kimbery Kagan and Research Director Marisa Cochrane Sullivan sat down with Voice of America’s Meredith Buel to discuss possible implications and outcomes.

“A Sea Change in Pakistan?” by Jeffrey Dressler and Reza Jan (SWJ)

“A Sea Change in Pakistan?”

by Jeffrey Dressler and Reza Jan, Small Wars Journal, 12 March 2010

View the PDF on the Small Wars Journal

Pakistani forces have seized a number of high-ranking Quetta Shura Taliban (QST) leaders in recent weeks. Pakistan has actively supported the QST in Afghanistan (which it created in 1995) as a proxy force to ensure Pakistan’s influence in Afghanistan and defend against Indian encroachment there. The recent arrests have caused a flurry of speculation about possible changes in Pakistani policy. Some analysts argue that these recent arrests signal Pakistan’s wholesale abandonment of the Afghan Taliban while others are quick to dismiss these actions as self-serving. Pakistani decision making is rarely so clear, however, especially regarding an issue of such momentous importance. There appears to be a fissure in Pakistan’s long-standing support for the QST.

Scenario 1: The Optimists

Supporters of the optimistic assessment that Pakistan has definitively turned against the QST argue that Pakistan is actively targeting the movement for two possible reasons. Either the QST’s growing nexus with Pakistani Taliban poses too great a threat to Pakistan’s internal security or the Pakistani establishment has come to believe that the coalition will be successful in Afghanistan and wants to be on the winning side.

The first argument is based on the assessment that the QST has grown too close to Pakistani militant organizations that have been at odds with the Pakistani establishment for years, but increasingly since late 2009. As these Pakistan-focused groups have become more powerful over the last two years, they have launched increasingly brazen attacks on the Pakistani establishment. Much of these groups’ motivation appears to come from what these groups perceive as Pakistani kow-towing to the U.S., including Pakistan’s docility in the face of U.S. drone strikes in Pakistani Taliban territory over the last several years. The back and forth between the government and the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) in particular reached a peak when Pakistan’s Army launched an unprecedented assault on the TTP’s South Waziristan sanctuary in the fall of 2009.

Currently, as Pakistan’s Army consolidates its gains in South Waziristan and appears to be considering taking on militants groups elsewhere, some believe Pakistan has finally had it with their longtime ally, the QST and have decided to wrap them up as well. Senator John Kerry announced that the capture of the QSTs second-in-command, Mullah Baradar, signaled Pakistan’s determination to “go after the Taliban wherever they are.”

The second argument optimists’ offer is that Pakistan now believes that the coalition will be successful in Afghanistan and has decided to back the winning horse—which means giving-up the QST. According to this scenario, the Pakistani establishment has been convinced by substantial American military gains in Afghanistan as well as substantial U.S. and Saudi aid and diplomatic engagement that it is no longer beneficial to continue supporting the QST. Many analysts posit that the recent arrests of as much as half of the Taliban’s senior leadership, including Mullah Baradar and, allegedly, Maulvi Kabir, are not accidental, but rather evidence of Pakistan’s shift in strategic posture.

These optimistic assessments do not hold water. The QST is only concerned about defeating the coalition and Afghan government in Afghanistan and does not actively support attacks against the Pakistani state. In fact, on several occasions, the QST has sent emissaries to meet with the Pakistani Taliban to try to convince them to cease attacks on the Pakistani state and instead direct their efforts in support of the QST in Afghanistan. There is no evidence that the QST has operated against Pakistani interests or actively supported other groups in doing so, and thus no reason for the Pakistani establishment to have suddenly come to see the QST as a threat.

It is also unlikely that Pakistan’s leaders have decided to give up the QST because they have concluded that the coalition will ultimately succeed in Afghanistan. Despite the influx of more than 30,000 troops and a comprehensive counterinsurgency strategy, there has not yet been any defining event that could possibly have swayed Pakistan away from years of support for the QST. Military progress in Helmand progress, moreover, has been offset by President Obama’s announcement of a July 2011 deadline for the start of an American withdrawal—a deadline that has received a great deal of attention in Pakistan as evidence of America’s waning commitment. Optimists also point to substantial aid packages, high level diplomatic engagement and Saudi intervention as motivating factors that sweetened the deal. None of these developments address the core Pakistani interest in maintaining influence in Afghanistan, however.

Scenario 2: The Pessimists

Given Pakistan’s longstanding support for the QST, it is prudent to be skeptical of the claim that Pakistan has rapidly reversed its stance towards its traditional proxies. That said, after Pakistan’s arrest of a significant portion of the QST’s senior leadership circle, some are still arguing that Pakistan’s action against the QST does not represent a real a shift in its policy towards the Afghan Taliban.

To continue reading the full article, please visit the Small Wars Journal.

Jeffrey Dressler is a Research Analyst at the Institute for the Study of War and author of the recent report “Securing Helmand: Understanding and Responding to the Enemy.” Reza Jan is a Researcher at Critical Threats Project of the American Enterprise Institute and recent author of “The FATA Conflict after South Waziristan: Pakistan’s War against Militants Continues in Orakzai, Kurram, Bajaur, and North Waziristan.”

Iraqi Elections: Is This Democracy?

You are cordially invited to a briefing for young professionals regarding the outcomes of the March 7th Iraqi elections, hosted by the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) and the Foreign Policy Initiative (FPI) on the evening of Thursday, March 11.

Regional experts will offer their analysis on the electoral process, validity of the pending results, likelihood of peaceful government formation and the fate of Iraq’s leading political figures.
Questions on the impacts of elections on the U.S. troop withdrawal, Iranian and Syrian ambitions inside Iraq and long term security implications will also be addressed.

Panelists:

Charles W. Dunne – Scholar, Middle East Institute Marisa Cochrane Sullivan – Research Director, Institute for the Study of War James Danly -Fellow, Institute for the Study of War Former U.S. Army officer Jamie M. Fly – Moderator,Executive Director, Foreign Policy Initiative

When:
March 11, 2010
6:30 – 7:00 PM EST
Cocktail Reception
7:00 – 8:00 PM EST

Where:
Institute for the Study of War
Rooftop conference room
1616 P St NW (entrance)
Washington, DC 20036
Google Map

Public Forum-Evaluating Iraq’s Future after Elections

Evaluating Iraq’s Future after Elections

On March 7th, an estimated 18.9 million registered Iraqi voters will participate in the country’s second parliamentary election, facilitating what could be their most important transfer of national power. Even if the elections are free and fair, fluctuating coalitions vying for ministerial positions could make the political landscape in Iraq very volatile for months to come.

Will the drawdown of U.S. forces be adversely affected by the election results? Will minority voters support a governing coalition despite the purging of national Sunni political leaders? What are the prospects for a stable and democratic Iraq after these elections? Please Join ISW Iraq experts for answers to these questions and much more.

Panelists: Marisa Cochrane Sullivan
Research Director, ISW
Former Command Historian for MNF-I

James Danly
Fellow, ISW
Former U.S. Army officer

Moderator: Dr. Kimberly Kagan
President, ISW

When: Thursday, March 11, 2010

0845 -0900
Registration and light breakfast

0900 – 1000
Presentation on the Iraqi elections

Where: Institute for the Study of War
Rooftop conference room
1616 P St NW (entrance)
Washington, DC 20036

RSVP: RSVP@understandingwar.org
(202) 293-5550

The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) is a non-partisan, non-profit, public policy research organization. ISW advances an informed understanding of military affairs through reliable research, trusted analysis, and innovative education. We are committed to improving the nation’s ability to execute military operations and respond to emerging threats in order to achieve U.S. strategic objectives.www.UnderstandingWar.org

Operation Moshtarak: Preparing for the Battle of Marjah

This Backgrounder is the first installment in a series of reports documenting and analyzing the battle for Marjah in Helmand province.

Introduction

Operation Moshtarak (Dari for “Together”) is the first major offensive for U.S., coalition and Afghan forces to employ the new reinforcements ordered by President Obama in December of 2009. The mission is to retake the town of Marjah in Helmand province, a Taliban stronghold and center of the opium network. Moshtarak is expected to include as many as 15,000 U.S., coalition, and Afghan troops and will likely commence within the coming days.

To download the full backgrounder, click here.

Operation Moshtarak: Taking and Holding Marjah

This Backgrounder is the second installment in a series of reports analyzing the battle for Marjah in Helmand province.

Introduction

Operation Moshtarak is the largest joint operation of the war thus far. The operation is taking place in southern Helmand province, one of the focal points of General McChrystal’s strategy where Afghan and International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) will look to seize the momentum from the Taliban. This backgrounder is the second in a series of reports analyzing Operation Moshtarak, the battle for Marjah.

To download the full backgrounder, click here.

To read the previous backgrounder in the series, click here.

The Future of Iraq: A Conversation with General Raymond T. Odierno (video)

The Future of Iraq: A Conversation with General Raymond T. Odierno

February 16, 2010

Having spent the last three years in Iraq, General Raymond T. Odierno is uniquely aware of Iraq’s acute challenges and strategic opportunities. General Odierno has served as the Commander of U.S. Forces-Iraq since September 2008. He previously served as the Commanding General for the U.S. Army III Corps from May 2006 to September 2008, and therefore served as the Commander of Multi-National Corps-Iraq during the Corps’ deployment from November 2006 to February 2008. General Odierno also commanded the 4th Infantry Division during its deployment to Iraq from April 2003 to March 2004. “He is noted for being one of few Army generals in history to command a division, corps and entire theater in the same conflict.”

On February 16th, the Institute for the Study of War hosted an event with General Odierno at the Army and Navy Club. General Odierno offered his insights into Iraq’s evolution since the Surge, the political challenges facing Iraq this year, the security challenges that the American drawdown will pose to Iraq, the policies of Iraq’s neighbors, and the potential for long-term success.

Obama’s Troop Surge Supports Earlier Goals- Washington Examiner

Obama’s Troop Surge Supports Earlier Stated Goals

ISW President Kimberly Kagan, Washington Examiner, December 15, 2009

President Obama recently announced his decision to increase the number of U.S. forces in Afghanistan by at least 30,000 troops in pursuit of the same goals that he had originally articulated in March: “To disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and to prevent its capacity to threaten America and our allies in the future.”

He identified the objectives that the United States will need to achieve in support of this mission. “We must deny al Qaeda a safe haven. We must reverse the Taliban’s momentum and deny it the ability to overthrow the government. And we must strengthen the capacity of Afghanistan’s security forces and government, so that they can take lead responsibility for Afghanistan’s future.”

The president has repeatedly failed to explain adequately why reversing the Taliban’s momentum is a necessary prerequisite for the ultimate defeat of al Qaeda. Both in his West Point address and in Sunday’s “60 Minutes” interview he emphasized the relationship between the two groups resulting from their co-location along the Durand Line separating Afghanistan from Pakistan. But that geographical proximity is only part of the tie between the groups that requires the United States to act in Afghanistan while Pakistan operates along its side of the border against separate but related extremists.

There is, in fact, a clear and cogent answer to the question of why we must defeat the Taliban in Afghanistan in order to defeat al Qaeda. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates made the case succinctly in his recent testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee. “Defeating al Qaeda and enhancing Afghan security are mutually reinforcing missions. They cannot be untethered from one another, as much as we might wish that to be the case.” The Taliban and al Qaeda are linked, not only by the events leading up to 9/11 — mentioned by Obama in his speech — but by their vision of history, their ideology, and the human networks that sustain them.

He added, “While al Qaeda is under great pressure now and dependent on the Taliban and other extremist groups, for sustainment, the success of the Taliban would vastly strengthen al Qaeda’s message, to the Muslim world, that violent extremists are on the winning side of history. Put simply, the Taliban and al Qaeda have become symbiotic, each benefiting from the success and mythology of the other. Al Qaeda leaders have stated this explicitly and repeatedly.”

This argument is not simply a renewed version of some untested domino theory. Gates testified that “Taliban success in retaking and holding parts of Afghanistan, against the combined forces of multiple modern armies — the current direction of events — has dramatically strengthened the extremist mythology and popular perceptions of who is winning and who is losing.”

To read the full column, please visit the Washington Examiner.



Lieutenant General Jim Dubik Visits NPR

ISW Senior Fellow General Dubik visits NPR to discuss the nuts and bolts of training and Afghan army.